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Exploring human uniqueness encounters fundamental challenges because we can approach this 
endeavour only from within our uniquely human perspective. The intrinsic presumptions that this 
involves may entail two types of anthropocentric, ethnocentric, and egocentric biases, which can 
influence research on both epistemological and methodological levels. Their impact may be 
particularly pronounced if quests for the origins of human sociality are based only on our 
knowledge about humans. Tomasello’s (2019) research demonstrates that the comparative 
study of humans and nonhuman species offers unique opportunities to explore forms of social 
cooperation, underlying cognitive and meta-cognitive abilities as well as pathways in their 
ontological and (possible) phylogenetic development. It also shows that comparative approaches 
are essential to unravel the ways in which humans are indeed unique. But species comparisons 
are challenged by the need to consider inherent trade-offs between achieving operational 
comparability in empirical studies and establishing ecological validity for the species compared—
challenges, which analogously occur in comparisons across human cultures as well. This shows 
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1. Introduction 
What makes us uniquely human is one of the big questions of humankind—and one of 
the most challenging ones—because we can never step outside of ourselves as human beings 
and take an objective view on this peculiar species that we are. How extraordinary actually are 
our human abilities for joint agency and moral behaviour? Did their emergence in evolution 
presuppose social and cultural structures? Or did social roles first emerge on more local levels 
of collaboration between individuals, thus preceding and maybe even first enabling the 
development of societal structures, as Tomasello (2019) suggested?  
Researchers are always human beings themselves, equipped with only human-specific 
abilities, interests and views on the world. Therefore, researchers can explore human 
uniqueness only from within their uniquely human perspective, and thus cannot be independent 
from their objects of research. From the perspective of today’s humans, as we are all socialised 
in institutionalised cultural structures, it is difficult to imagine an evolutionary human past when 
such structures had not yet existed. This view cannot simply be stripped off from our thinking 
because it forms an integral part of our social cognition, knowledge and language as individuals 
and thus also as scientists (Valsiner, 2012). Given this, theories suggesting that institutionalised 
structures are essential for the development of human sociality therefore seem only natural. We 
may not even be able to imagine any alternatives when we consider only what we know about 
today’s humans.  
History is full of examples of how preconceived ideas about ‘fundamental’ differences 
between ‘humans’ and ‘animals’ effectively hindered explorations of other species’ behavioural, 
psychical and social abilities—and thus, also identification of those abilities that are, indeed, 
uniquely human. 
1.1 Anthropocentric, ethnocentric and egocentric type I and type II biases 
Our inherently species-specific perspective on the world involves various presumptions 
that are intrinsic to all human individuals and that may entail two types of systematic errors for 
research (Uher, 2016). Anthropocentric biases type I occur when researchers (unintentionally) 
focus on only those phenomena that they can access easily given their own species-specific 
abilities, that are human-like (anthropomorphic), or perceived as such in the sense of false 
positive biases. Anthropocentric biases type II, by contrast, occur when researchers ignore those 
phenomena that they cannot readily perceive or conceive of, that are not human-like or not 
perceived as such in the sense of false negative biases. Analogous types of ethnocentric biases 
occur when researchers (unintentionally) approach their study phenomena from their own 
sociocultural position. This is because their gender, culture, nationality, worldview, language, 
historical time, scientific discipline or school of thought, to name just a few, make them insiders 
to particular communities and outsiders to others, each exhibiting their own particular biases 
(Geertz, 1988). Analogously, egocentric biases of both types occur when researchers’ scientific 
explorations are (unintentionally) influenced by their own personal standpoints.  
These two types of biases occur in all disciplines and can influence research on two 
levels (Uher, 2016). On the epistemological level, they can influence what phenomena 
researchers consider objects of research, how they conceive of and define these phenomena, 
and what questions they ask about them. On the methodological level, both types of biases can 
influence the ways (i.e., approaches) in which these questions are being tackled and the 
techniques (i.e., methods) that researchers therefore use.  
For example, preconceptions about human uniqueness, reflected in anthropocentric 
definitions of study phenomena like ‘personality’ and ‘culture’, have long prevented researchers 
from even considering the idea that individual-specific behaviours (Uher, 2008, 2018b) and 
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group-specific socially-transmitted behaviours and knowledge (Schuppli & van Schaik, 2019) 
may occur also in some nonhuman species. Overcoming anthropocentric biases on 
epistemological levels by elaborating definitions of ‘personality’ and ‘culture’ that apply to other 
species as well opened up possibilities for exploring how these phenomena may have emerged 
in human evolution as well as their possible precursors, homologues and analogues in other 
species. But intricate challenges also arise from possible biases on methodological levels, which 
cannot be solved easily.  
1.2 Challenges for species comparisons in social cognition research  
Exploring the role that social roles may have played in the evolution of human sociality 
(Tomasello, 2019) is a challenging endeavour in which anthropocentric, ethnocentric and 
egocentric biases of both types and on epistemological as well as on methodological levels may 
co-occur and overlap, making their recognition particularly difficult. Their impact may be even 
particularly pronounced given that (unlike e.g., morphology) social roles and individuals’ 
pertinent cognitions and knowledge are not publicly observable in themselves but can only be 
inferred, inevitably with possible errors, from individuals’ behaviours and verbalised ideas, the 
latter being accessible only in humans. Moreover, neither social roles, nor pertinent cognitions 
and knowledge, nor behavioural or verbal interactions leave any fossilised traces in themselves. 
They can only be reconstructed indirectly from archaeological findings, making the exploration of 
their possible evolutionary pathways prone to speculations.  
2. Comparative psychology: Alternative perspectives and approaches  
Cross-species comparative psychology opens up fundamentally new perspectives and 
contributes alternative concepts and methods that may help minimise the various kinds of type I 
and II biases and disentangle pathways in the ontogenetic and (possible) phylogenetic 
development of human sociality and other features assumed to be uniquely human. It offers 
illuminative approaches by studying species with different degrees of phylogenetic relatedness 
to humans; different behavioural, social and ecological systems; and, important for studying 
sociality, without institutionalised forms of social cooperation. Empirical studies on today’s living 
species can, even if only indirectly, provide some evidence for the likelihood of particular 
evolutionary pathways, thereby reducing the level of speculation inherent to any evolutionary 
research.  
2.1 New insights into the ways in which humans are actually unique 
Systematic comparisons of humans with other animal species opened up fascinating new 
insights into various forms of social cooperation among individuals and the cognitive and meta-
representative abilities underlying them. Such comparisons revealed important qualitative 
differences in the ways in which human individuals, already during childhood, cooperate and 
think about others as compared, for example, to individuals of our closest living relatives, the 
nonhuman great apes, with whom we share a long phylogenetic history. Tomasello’s (2019) 
research highlighted that humans, but not nonhuman primates, knowingly take up roles in larger 
social systems. Similarly, other researchers showed that great apes are cultural but not 
knowingly so (Gruber, Zuberbuehler, Clement, & van Schaik, 2015). These findings identify the 
meta-cognitive abilities to represent knowledge, especially knowledge about relationships with 
others, as a determining feature of human’s behavioural, psychical and social uniqueness.  
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2.2 Anthropocentric biases on methodological levels 
A further key contribution of comparative psychology, owed to the involvement of 
nonhuman species, is the use of behavioural methods of data collection. Behavioural methods 
are essential for valid comparisons because rating methods, dominating in psychological 
research on humans, fail to meet the meta-conditions of measurement (Uher, 2018a), which 
renders them prone to all kinds of biases. Comparative studies contrasting observations and 
measurements of individual behaviours with standardised assessments showed that raters’ 
stereotypical beliefs about human individuals (e.g., related to age, sex) influenced their 
‘personality’ judgments of nonhuman primate individuals. These biases are highly complex and 
not straightforwardly recognisable, and most likely occur in similar ways in judgements of human 
individuals as well (Uher & Visalberghi, 2016; Uher, Werner, & Gosselt, 2013).  
But behavioural methods are not free of anthropocentric pitfalls either. For valid 
investigations and cross-species comparisons, species specificities must be considered, which 
may, however, compromise direct comparability in terms of identical operational study designs 
and procedures. Necessarily, operational designs to study humans often cannot be identical to 
those needed to study other species, and vice versa. In gaze-following studies, for example, 
attempts to use the same 10-second gaze cue did not work out for all species (Tomasello, Hare, 
Lehmann, & Call, 2007) because species differ in how they pay attention to their environments 
(e.g., orangutans generally do not gaze at others more than two seconds but are still highly 
vigilant; Rijksen, 1978). Confronting animal individuals with a human experimenter to study their 
joint attention skills may be needed to establish comparable control conditions in behavioural 
experiments. However, this setting may be ecologically valid only for domesticated species for 
which such inter-specific encounters played a crucial role in their evolutionary development—
much in contrast to wild species like great apes. This makes it difficult to disentangle actual 
differences in the species’ abilities from differences that are only caused, or at least influenced, 
by the level of ecological validity that can be established for the given species in a given study 
design.   
This example highlights that comparability cannot be established on the level of 
operational definition but only on the conceptual level, considering the functions and meanings 
that particular behaviours and contexts have for the given study population (Uher, 2015). 
Researchers must carefully consider an inherent trade-off between ecological validity and the 
comparability of study designs—not only in comparisons of different species but also in 
comparisons of different sociocultural communities in humans. Awareness of and reflection 
about the various kinds of biases that can occur on both epistemological and methodological 
levels are important to tackle these fundamental challenges.  
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